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  1. oh Potato Knishes... the GPG web of trust is dead https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f

    Sunday, 30-Jun-19 11:39:51 UTC from indy.im
    1. @boneidol The signature-flooding attack on the SKS # (and DoS of their users) is bad but doesn't actually sound like any kind of #, and has basically nothing to do with the #; signature-chains maybe, but that's something else entirely. !crypto

      Monday, 01-Jul-19 19:40:24 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
      1. @rozzin Maybe I am misunderstanding, but the poisoning prevents people from updating keys to check trust paths. The proposed replacement service https://keys.openpgp.org/ does not link ID ( email address) to the public key, unless asked to.  And more importantly from a WoT is does not have any third party signatures.  So can't be used to follow a trust path

        Tuesday, 02-Jul-19 09:24:18 UTC from indy.im
        1. @rozzin https://keys.openpgp.org/about/faq  https://indy.im/attachment/138122

          Tuesday, 02-Jul-19 09:32:16 UTC from indy.im
        2. Contrary to popular belief, "trust paths" are not actually a thing in #

          Tuesday, 02-Jul-19 12:12:09 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
          1. @rozzin help me out!
            what am I doing then when I get a new key from someone I've not communicated with, and check the signatures to see if there are any people in common ? 

            What are the people at Tails doing here ?  https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/usb-download/index.en.html#install-inc-steps-download.inline.web-of-trust  https://indy.im/attachment/138158

            It looks to me like building a human connection through the WoT 

            Tuesday, 02-Jul-19 12:38:09 UTC from indy.im
            1. There is a chance I've misunderstood what you mean when you say "trust paths" if by "path" you didn't mean "linked lists that may be >1 indirection long". If so, sorry!☺

              Wednesday, 03-Jul-19 04:33:56 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
            2. That #'s # metrics (supposedly) propagate through signature-chains is somehow basically an extremely popular #; "talks about WoT being all about arbitrarily-long multi-hop chains of trust" and "conflates # and # #" have been "understands-pgp-p" litmus tests for me since I realized how confused *I was myself* years ago, and they've never failed before.

              Wednesday, 03-Jul-19 04:49:32 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
            3. It may also matter that when I say "#", I really mean "#" because AFAICT GPG is the PGP that everyone actually uses these days. There are "trust signatures" in #, and GPG can make and use them..., but they're a whole different thing from "trust", "signatures", and # And I don't think I've ever actually seen one in the wild. Some other PGP implementation might use tsigs by default? But I doubt it?

              Wednesday, 03-Jul-19 04:56:58 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
            4. That # "use the WoT" download # guide is telling you to do 2 distinct things:
              1) use # WoT metrics to identify someone who is a Tails developer (but not AFAICT to identify that person *as* a Tails developer);
              2) make a WoT-less leap from "this is Bob" to "Bob is verified as a Tails developer AND his signatures mean something".

              In that "→A→B→C" chain of mixed ops, # only takes you to B.

              Wednesday, 03-Jul-19 05:15:55 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
            5. So, "what am I doing when I get a new key from someone and check the signatures to see if there are any people in common" depends heavily on what you mean by "check the signatures" and "people in common". If you mean "trace through signature-chains with no # # to find *reachable* signatures", then no you're not using # verification, you're making your own inferences based on something else.

              Wednesday, 03-Jul-19 14:32:33 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
    2. Also it seems kind of inappropriate to be using "poisoning" as its being used here: https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f !crypto

      Monday, 01-Jul-19 19:42:36 UTC from status.hackerposse.com
    3. ALSO, I'm reminded that there was this other # # released a few years ago, compatible w/ # but written in #, which might relieve some of "zomg unmaintainable!" problems with the SKS servers: https://hockeypuck.github.io/ !crypto # #

      Monday, 01-Jul-19 19:50:40 UTC from status.hackerposse.com